跳到主要內容

Taiwan’s Problematic Shift to “Living with Virus” COVID Policy in 2022 (2022/June)

 

Taiwan’s Problematic Shift to “Living with Virus” COVID Policy in 2022: Its Recent Historical and Social Processes

 

by Daiwie Fu, June 2022

 

(Note: This article was published in Critical Asia Archives: events and theories. 2022 Taiwan topic: Vaccine: Molar and Molecular

Topics like “Taiwan, hailed for its gold standard Covid strategy, now faces potential for lots of deaths”(Telegraph, 6/May), or “Once a zero-Covid poster child, island learns to live with the viruses”(Guardian, 9/May) suddenly popped out in British papers early this May. Apparently Taiwan’s Covid-19 pandemic control policy has gone through a major, but problematic shift. This shift cannot simply be understood by the developments in recent months, it would need to dig into the depth of Taiwan’s major epidemic control institution CECC (Central Epidemic Control Center), including its recent history, its moral assumption, medical expertise, and its interests under Taiwan’s DPP (Democratic Progress Party) administration.

CECC is headed by Taiwan’s minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-Chung 陳時中 for more than two years since the outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic. In stead of being the so-called “zero-Covid poster child,” there were of courses many early crisis situations badly managed by CECC, including the notorious scramble for face masks. In general, CECC is a very powerful and authoritative unit by law. It has a structure dominated by command center and expert groups with medical doctors only, and it can command supports from various ministries in Taiwan’s administration. It regularly offers a daily news conference at 2pm, which is the only public window to society at large. Its high power is understandable only in short term pandemic emergency situation. However, after more than two years in power, it has become quite authoritarian and even arrogant against timid media reporters. Very often its news conference was reduced only to strong policy announcements, if not show stage performance of CECC and DPP administration.

Some preliminary comments here would be about Taiwan’s own problematic Covid vaccine production: the Medigan Covid-19 vaccine (MVC 高端). It was strongly supported by DPP government as a MIT (Made in Taiwan) product, with TV propaganda of Taiwan’s president Cai, also backed up by former vice president and eminent public health expert C-J Chen 陳建仁. While MVC is made from an unusual biomedical process (CHO cell protein), the more serious problem is in its defective clinical trials. It has only gone through the first two phases, without the critical mid-term result of the third clinical trial. This is quite problematic and defective if compared with other more standard Covid-19 vaccines that had received EUA from other major countries, EU or WHO. Dr. Chen and other experts of MVC intend to justify MVC’s problematic clinical trial by claiming that MVC had used a special/new methodology of “immune-bridging” 免疫橋接 to compare MVC with other major vaccines. And if the comparison results are positive for MVC, then it is justified in skipping the entire third clinical trial. However, this “bridging” methodology was not accepted by US, EU or WHO and thus cannot get important EUAs from them. This shows the problematic medical expertise of MVC and was also criticized by Taiwan’s other eminent biomedical scientists such as P-J Chen陳培哲.

As a result, MVC had only low acceptability within Taiwan’s general public, even if it had managed to get Taiwan’s own EUA. Yet CECC strongly supported MVC from the very beginning by pre-ordering a huge amount of MVC vaccines with very expensive price. And due to low acceptability in Taiwan, many of them were wasted after expiration dates. As Taiwan’s DPP administration was wrong about its expectation of MVC, and was also hesitant and very late in buying adequate foreign vaccines, plus unwilling to buy them from or through China, Taiwan’s population was late and difficult to get adequate vaccines to stop Covid-19 viruses like Alpha. Quie a few infected died, and for a time Taiwan had the highest mortality rate in the developed and East Asian countries (4.99% in 2020-21)! Big controversies had also erupted about whether CECC was fair in distributing precious foreign vaccines or was favorable mostly to officials in DPP administration or to other privileged people.

If Taiwan had been called a zero-Covid poster child, it was probably due to two things: a general public acceptance and availability of face masks in the middle phase of Covid 19 control. This comes from the efforts and accommodations of Taiwan’s public, waiting in long queues before drugstores, and also comes from the efforts of our “face-mask-making national teams” 口罩國家隊 in quickly producing massive, inexpensive face masks. Taiwan’s administration should have some credits in organizing these national teams. The second thing is Taiwan’s relatively low Covid cases during the initial phase of Omicron virus. This was roughly the moment in many Euro-American and East Asian countries like Korea, Singapore, and Japan, when they were having sky-rocketing Omicron cases per day. A simple reason for the low Covid cases was that Taiwan had made very strict border controls (邊境嚴管) to people from abroad: a general PCR examination upon entry plus 14 days quarantine for everybody. CECC was originally very reluctant to implement these measures, despite of constant criticisms from the public and oppositional parties. CECC preferred directly sending people from abroad to pandemic control hotels for two weeks quarantine. After several severe group infections in quarantine hotels and airport, plus seeing many record breaking Covid cases abroad, CECC finally adopted a general and strict measures in airport since July 2021. And this makes Taiwan’s low Covid cases in comparisons with those of quite a few other countries until March of 2022.

Towards the end of 2021 and early 2022, quite a few countries ranging from Euro-America to Asian, a new pandemic control or “retreat” strategy had emerged: to live with the virus. Partly due to long term fatigue from controls, but also due to fuller vaccinations, plus of course the need for economic recovery from lockdowns and restrictions, the new strategy had gradually spread out, against quite a few doctors’ reservations of course. South Korea for example, it has boldly announced this strategy and aims for “returning to normal life” in Nov. 1st of 2021, when it has about a daily 2500 Omicron cases and an accumulated 2858 deaths since 2020, with a 3rd vaccination rate less than 50% nationwide. The pandemic control center of South Korea did not know then that 8 months later, Omicron had infected more than a third of its population (the highest infected cases in 17/March being four hundred thousands), with 8.5 times of deaths as a result. Taking only this year’s deaths from Omicron, South Korea’s fatality rate is 0.11%, about the same with France, but higher than Singapore, Australia and New Zealand. In reflection, is South Korea’s “living with virus” strategy from last November a wise and matured strategy? I very much doubt that.

In comparison, Taiwan’s pandemic control has been late in adopting this fashionable “living with virus” strategy. However, apparently Taiwan’s DPP government did not wish to lagging too much behind this Euro-American world new trends, it seems to have quietly decided to go for it early this spring, when in 7/March CECC announced to a somewhat relaxation of the strict border controls from 14 to 10 days, so called the “small relaxation” 微解封, in a time when Taiwan’s daily Omicron cases is smaller than 20. This policy was naturally under criticism, in a society which is used to the zero-Covid policy. A month later, DPP government and CECC formally announced in 7/April a “new Taiwan model” which stressed a balance between economic growth and “disaster mitigation” 減災, admitting Taiwan’s current difficulty for zero-Covid. This was announced in a time when Taiwan’s O cases have gradually picked up to hundreds. Mainstream media had often blamed the sudden rising of O cases simply to the extreme spreading power of Omicron, while forgetting about the fact that it was preceded by one month of CECC’s dubious “small relaxation” policy.

After announcing the new Taiwan model, DPP government pushed further relaxation policies both formally and informally, when O cases perform triple jumps. A famous example of how CECC’s chief Chen underestimated the power of Omicron is this. When asked by a reporter in 12/April (with 551 O cases) CECC press conference about when Taiwan’s daily O cases would exceed one thousand, Chen estimated that it would be in the end of April. But this O cases number should jump over one thousand only three days later: 15/April with 1209 O cases! Examples like this and many others show that CECC, while recklessly going for a “living with virus” (LWV) policy, had grossly underestimate the power of Omicron and also very poorly prepared for that fashionable new policy. As our O cases in triple jumps, the availability of “rapid test” kits were in severe scarcity and expensive, nor the Omicron medicine like Paxlovid was easy to find behind extremely bureaucratic red taps. Without engaging in responsible public hearing debates and parliament considerations for this new policy, DPP government had marshalled its dominant propaganda to indoctrinate the public with this supposedly good and inevitable LWV wave from “the West.”

One important informal channel for this LWV was propagated by an adjunct biomedical researcher-cum-propagandist, M-S He 何美鄉, famous for her public provocations and popular for her lectures in DPP’s central party assemblies. In early April, He had publicly spread the idea that getting infected by Omicron is something not to be feared, actually “a blessing,” due to its expected strong immunity after recovery, but without carefully warning the dangerous potential of Omicron to high risk populations, the problematic duration of this immunity, nor about the already much discussed Long Covid residual symptoms. Although CECC did not publicly endorse He’s provocation, her problematic ideas dovetailed well with DPP’s new strategy and are popular in DPP’s gossip channels. However, public suspicion of this LWV policy remained strong: TPOF’s poll (26/April) showed 46.3% of the opinions against LWV, with only 45% for it.

Some important social and medical criticism emerged in this May to criticize DDP’s LWV strategy. A noted journalist W-C Chen 陳文茜 wrote “Stories of three women in Covid pandemic” (7/May), criticizing CECC’s reckless LWV policy which ignores the precious lives of small children, who had no vaccine to protect themselves, and Taiwan’s elderly people, who obviously suffer as the main death toll for this Omicron wave through LWV. Taiwan’s DPP government, wrote Chen, should not consider human right only in terms of their sorrow political prosecution (by KMT) in the past and the right to vote in the present. “Every human being under Taiwan’s ruling class, should be able to live a reasonable life with dignity.” Also a medical doctor S-T Chiu 邱淑緹, a former CDC manager, in 10/May supported Chen’s moral argument and raised, from US experience, more medical questions about this problematic LWV policy. Perhaps echoing Dr. Fauci’s earlier suspicion, Chiu even questioned the very conception of herd immunity in the present Covid pandemic context. And the current process in living with (or fighting against) Omicron are by no means the “final war” in this pandemic, as DDP’s administration claimed to be so in order to call upon people to endure Taiwan’s rocketing high O cases and record-breaking deaths in this April and May. As of 30/May, Taiwan’s O cases in 2022 are 1.84 million and 1312 deaths, thus the official case fatality rate is 0.071%. Although this rate seems still “a bit low,” if compared with other equally reckless East Asian country figures under similar LWV policies now available. But this rate would definitely go up, as Taiwan’s major wave of O cases is just reaching its high plateau, a major wave which is about three month late than other countries that had gone through their own major waves. Thus as we move forward to 13/July, Taiwan’s case fatality rate was up to 0.17%, higher than Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.[i]

Leaving aside issues of number, I now focus first on questions of morality and justice about this pandemic controls and its LWV policy. I begin with W-C Chen’s moral and social criticism of LWV. By what moral or political right do Taiwan’s DDP government and CECC have in pursuing a LWV policy that puts in grave danger most elderly people over 80 and small children under 5? Is this because of the demands of Taiwan’s economic recovery, or the profits of its ruling classes? It’s true that a healthy economic recovery in “returning to the normal life” is important for more people than the ruling classes. (But it’s interesting to note that Taiwan’s economy last year with a zero-Covid policy was pretty good, with a 6.28% economic growth, highest in 11 years.) How are we then to balance between economic recovery and the costs of hardship and deaths of the weak in population? And though they are the weak, they are parents and grandparents, or are the precious darlings, of the strong in population. This is a serious public and moral issue in changing the common conception of pandemic control from protecting people from diseases into something else. It thus needs to be debated and decided publicly. It is way beyond the usual pandemic control business and its authoritarian CECC decision process. Furthermore, the issue here is again beyond the DPP administration, naturally deliberation and debate are needed in public and to settle down in the parliament, if not by a national referendum.

My second question is about the social fabrics of Taiwan’s weak in population, especially the elderly people. CECC’s daily press conference begins by reporting only about the daily O cases, deaths, and the number of moderate to severe O cases, plus the percentage among the deaths of having chronic diseases, or of taking how many shots of vaccine. All these figures are only about individual’s medical conditions, not even concerning meaningful public health figures, let alone about the social and anthropological fabrics of these unfortunate elderly people. Perspectives of social sciences, social works, social and anthropological studies of medicine are basically excluded from our CECC expert circles. However, socially understanding Taiwan’s population weak and elderly is crucial to mitigate the disasters faced by them. For example, those elderly people stay or live in Taiwan’s various long-term care institutions長照機構, usually the most hard-hit area in LWV policy, as already shown in South Korea’s experience (35% of the total deaths, even if 90% of them already had three vaccines, much higher than that in Taiwan).[ii]

In this sense, social fabric helps are more important than how many vaccines they as individuls had taken. But traditionally, Taiwan’s medical institutions do not care much about the social fabric of the patients or elderly, conveniently they pass this burden to their “family.” Thus elderly people live in long-term care institutions, plus those staying home within fragile family networks or with other young but careless family members, or even those living alone, if not homeless, are naturally the high (social) risks people--not the medically high risks. And Taiwan’s CECC and its medical circles had hardly paid attention to them.


AUTHOR

Daiwie Fu, National Yang-Ming Chiao Tung University, Professor Emeritus, Taiwan



[i] This short article was originally finished at the end of May, while only this sentence here was added at 23/July. Thus, as also warned by Taiwan’s noted public health scholar Chan Chang-chuan 詹長權in 17/July, concerning the Omicron mortality rates of every ten years age level of Taiwan compared with those of Japan since Jan. to July this year, Taiwan’s rates are generally 6 times higher, and especially for the 0-9 years old level, Taiwan’s rate is 14 times higher!

[ii] Close to 30% out of the total deaths in the final two weeks of May come from Taiwan’s similar institutions.

 

 

 

留言

新基進筆記的熱門文章…

對海軍磐石艦疫情管控問題之討論

  對海軍磐石艦疫情管控問題之討論 海軍磐石油彈補給艦與檢疫相關的基本配備 (wiki 等資料 ) :官兵基本載量 165 人,內附野戰醫院, 3 病房、 15 病床,並有負壓隔離病房、 X 光機。甲板及機庫可各停放 33 噸大型直昇機,可垂直整補。磐石艦滿載吃水量 2 萬噸,是臺灣海軍目前噸位最大的軍艦。   本文企圖討論的基本問題:這次磐石艦 Covid-19 染疫,四月 15 日磐石艦 377 人下船回家,結果 18 日發生三個確診病例,當天指揮中心急召回敦睦艦隊共 744 人回營集中檢疫,全台幾個醫學中心在緊急檢驗之下,隔天發現磐石艦確診增加 21 人。為什麼在磐石艦下船放假前,磐石艦的醫官、敦睦艦隊的支隊醫療小組(磐石艦有三位醫官、另兩艦各一位醫官)、艦指部的聯檢小組等,不覺得有何異樣或風險,把官兵全放下船放假?在三月 15 號離開帛琉之後的一個月中,磐石艦不能先行發現病毒感染,並進行隔離與其他措施? 其實,這次敦睦艦隊在世界疫情大流行中出訪,對於防疫措施不可謂沒有用心準備。茲列數項(按國防部事後檢討的書面報告):口罩一人一天一片共備 45 天三萬四千個(按此次行程共 37 天)、 600 套隔離衣、船艙換氣及消毒每天兩次,並分批分時用餐。每日量體溫三次,另出發前每人施打流感疫苗。艦隊 3 月 5 日出港前,官兵就已經登艦報到,艦上自主管理 14 天,雖然 228 連假放假下船,但官兵長期在船艦上 (37+11 天 ) 的確辛苦。不過,這次敦睦艦隊磐石號載官兵 377 人,顯然遠超過原來的設計 ( 若 wiki 正確 ) ,也大幅增加防疫的困難度與仔細度,自然是個問題。(目前筆者不知道支隊醫療小組醫官們的經驗、專科與資歷如何,據說磐石艦醫官是中尉,而三位醫官中兩位出自陸軍)   即使磐石艦的設備先進完備,但在海上與國內的通訊(包括醫療相關資訊)並不流暢,也有保密的問題。根據國防部報告,三月 18 日及 27 日,敦睦艦隊海上得知原本欲訪問的國家疫情狀況,故臨時取消兩地的訪問。而臺灣 CDC 在四月 3 日發佈嗅覺異常為染疫的新徵狀,但艦指部於四月 9 日才電郵通知艦隊(基本已經進港),且艦隊醫師並未回溯官兵是否有此徵狀,而上船的聯檢小組也未將之列...

戰爭正迫使烏克蘭左翼分子就暴力問題做出艱難的決定 (2022/Mar.)

  戰爭正迫使烏克蘭左翼分子就暴力問題做出艱難的決定 ( War Is Forcing Ukrainian Leftists to Make Difficult Decisions About Violence ) Mike Ludwig   Truthout 發表 2022 年 3 月 5 日      (此中文稿來自 Google Chinese translation, 在經過傅大為的修正與校定 12/Mar./2022 )   自從 2 月 24 日俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭以來,警笛聲和爆炸聲每天都在震撼 Yurii Sheliazhenko 位於基輔的五層樓房子。 Sheliazhenko 是烏克蘭和平運動的執行董事,在一個處於戰爭狀態的國家中為和平發出孤立而堅定的聲音。他因拒絕攜帶武器、不肯與鄰居一起製作燃燒彈以抵禦前進的俄羅斯軍隊而經歷了(來自國民的) “ 很多仇視 ” 。當然, 俄羅斯軍隊正面臨著來自烏克蘭平民轉為戰士的頑強抵抗。 “ 首先,說實話,和平沒有暴力途徑, ” 謝利亞任科在通過電子郵件詢問美國人可以做些什麼來支持烏克蘭的社會運動者時說。 在基輔附近的其他地方, “ 伊利亞 ” ( Ilya ) 和他的戰友已經拿起武器對抗俄羅斯軍隊,並正在為戰鬥進行訓練。因暴力升級而不得不隱瞞身份的伊利亞是一名無政府主義者,他逃離鄰國的政治鎮壓,決定抵抗俄羅斯的入侵。與來自烏克蘭和世界各地的無政府主義者、民主社會主義者、反法西斯主義者和其他左翼分子一起,伊利亞加入了 “ 領土防禦 ” 的 單位之一,該單位在烏克蘭軍隊的領導下像自願民兵一樣運作,具有一定程度的自治權。在互助組織和承擔民事職責的志願者的橫向聯盟的支持下,這些反威權主義者在領土防禦結構內擁有自己的 “ 國際分遣隊 ” ,並正在 籌集 物資─ 根據 一個名為抵抗委員會 (Resistance Committee) 的組織如是說。   表單的底部 “ 當敵人攻擊你時,很難採取反戰和平主義立場,這是因為你需要保護自己, ” 伊利亞在接受 Truthout 採訪時說。 Sheliazhenko 和 Ilya 的不同道路說明了烏克蘭的基進分子和進步的社會運動所面臨的艱...

從「洪水來臨前」的一點STS觀察

從「洪水來臨前」(Before the Flood)的一點STS觀察  奧斯卡最佳男主角李奧那多,這兩年來是聯合國的和平大使,走遍世界與全球暖化相關的地方,拍了相當多的訪問與觀察,然後與過去全球暖化的許多論點一起剪接起來,成為國家地理頻道已經在Youtube 免費播放第七天(還有三天)的 "Before the Flood" 紀錄片。片子不短,有95分鐘,但七天內我看到英文version的觀看次數已經突破千萬次,繁體中文版也達到一百八十萬次,就先不說其他語言的情況了。 李奧那多不是這幾年才趕流行成為關切全球暖化的尖兵,他年輕的時候,就已經很關心這個議題,也認真地訪問了一些政要,包括後來的歐巴馬。在某些片段裡,他坐在車子的後座,遙望逐漸往後逝去的遠景,的確有點像2006年前高爾在「不願面對的真相」中也是遠望的神情。但是當年高爾只是以美國前副總統的身份大力提倡,今天的李奧那多在世界上大概擁有更多的觀眾,且是聯合國的和平大使,在「洪水來臨前」的片尾,他在世界性的2015年巴黎氣候控制公約的大會中作結尾演說,所以他在美國之外,恐怕有更大的影響力。(在21世紀前十年,美國的民調仍常顯示相當大百分比的人不相信全球暖化) 那麼「洪水來臨前」在論證上,有多大的說服力呢?有多少新的論點呢?比起「不願面對」,我粗略的感覺是說服力差不多,也並沒有因為十年之後,而累積了更多的證據,而最明顯的增加,恐怕就是李奧那多的個人魅力了。以下,我想從STS的角度,來重新評估一下一些常見的論點(洪水來臨前與不願面對二片大致都有的)。例如強調這個科學爭議(究竟全球暖化的原因是甚麼?)幾乎已經結束,相信CO2說法的科學家已經達到97%。而剩下的3%的科學家,常常收受大石油公司、還有畜牧業的經費與計畫。他們都很積極地去顯示反對的科學家他們資源與利益的社會關係,繼而質疑反對的科學家們知識的可靠性。但是,如果從STS的公平與對稱原則來看,就應該也對97%贊成的科學家他們資源與利益的社會關係作分析,以前 Yearley 好像提過,贊成的科學家們也有幾個重要的組成成分。若能夠對稱性的作分析,我們或許對贊成的科學家們知識的可靠性,也有另一種評估。 當然,一個科技爭議,從對立到反對者只剩3%,大概這個爭議應該已算是終結了。美國...